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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Smedley has submitted an accurate Statement of Material Facts in his Brief of 
Appellant on file herein. The facts set forth by Appellees differ in many respects from 
those offered by Smedley. However, rather than identify each minute difference, the 
following Supplemental Statement of Material facts is offered to correct only the 
inaccurate fact statements included in the Brief for Appellees which are crucial to the 
issues and arguments of this appeal. 
1. The 1979 transaction between Smedley and Glausers, which is the genesis 
for this case, was intended to be a purchase of the Davis County Property by Smedley 
from Glausers (T. 136-140). Although Smedley and Glausers formally structured the 
purchase as a land exchange (Exhibit 1), the available1 evidence clearly shows that the 
transaction was a financed purchase of the Davis County Property, secured by the Davis 
County Property and other collateral, to be paid in regular monthly guaranteed 
installments, annual payments, and additional ongoing personal service obligations 
undertaken by Smedley. 
2. Under the 1979 transaction, Glausers sold the Melanie Acres Property to 
Smedley, in return for which Smedley agreed to deliver the following consideration: 
^medley was prevented from submitting relevant evidence as to the intended 
character of the transaction by the trial court's ruling on Appellees' Motion in Limine and 
further evidentiary rulings during the trial. See Argument, Point I, below. 
279837.1 
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a.. Monthly installment payments of not less than $2,000 per month 
together with one-half of all of the additional net profits earned from the storage units 
which are located on the Davis County Property (T. 136); 
b. Annual payment of $6,000 for vacations to be enjoyed by Glausers 
and their guests (T. 134, 136); 
c. Absolute conveyance of the Davis County Property by warranty deed 
to Glausers, to be held as security for the faithful performance of the obligations 
undertaken by Smedley (T. 139, 167); 
d. Management of the Davis County Property, including repairs, 
maintenance, payment of taxes, accounting, and the collection of rents from the tenants of 
the storage units (T. 137); and 
e. Pledge of a $300,000 escrow account to further assure Smedley's 
timely performance of his obligations (T. 136). 
< 
3. Most, but not all, of the above terms were included in the 1979 Agreement, 
prepared by Glausers' attorney and signed by Glausers and Smedley (Exhibit 1). 
mr 4. By March 1980, the parties had amended their 1979 Agreement and agreed < 
to substitute a pledge of the Salmon Property as collateral further securing Smedley's 
payment obligations to Glausers (T. 145, 147, Exhibit 4). 
1 
2 
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5. Although there was no written amendment to the 1979 Amendment, all of 
the parties to this case have stipulated to its existence, and the trial court ultimately 
acknowledged the "security" nature of the Salmon Property conveyance (R. 424, Tf 34). 
6. Over the next 14 years, Smedley faithfully undertook and substantially 
performed the material obligations of the 1979 transaction, including the regular payment 
of each monthly installment, the general repair and maintenance of the Davis County 
Property, and the maintenance of the Salmon Property (T. 151-154). 
7. However, due to unforeseen economic developments and severe health 
problems encountered by Smedley, he eventually became delinquent in his payments of 
taxes on both the Salmon Property and on the Davis County Property, and in the annual 
vacation pay (T. 175). 
8. The cash-poor Smedley agreed to provide other substitute compensation to 
repay Glausers from the financial defaults: 
a. Conveyance of three unimproved lots: one Cottonwood Lot and two 
Smedley Estate Lots, (the "Additional Lots") (T. 156-162, Exhibits 36, 37, 38); and 
b. Provision of labor and materials necessary to construct subdivision 
improvements upon two separate real estate developments then owned and being 
developed by Glausers: the Lakeview Project and the Heritage Project (the "Project 
Improvements") (T. 163). 
279837.1 
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9. Glausers approved Smedley's substitute performance as set forth above and, 
therefore, paid no other consideration to Smedley in return for the conveyance of the 
Additional Lots or the Project Improvements (T. 160-162). 
10. No billing statement, contract, invoice, canceled check, memorandum was 
produced by either party concerning the consideration owing from or paid by Glausers to 
Smedley for the Additional Lots and the Project Improvements. 
11. Although Appellees consistently testified to the meticulous record keeping 
of Mel Glauser, and Glausers' alleged disappointment in Smedley's performance under 
the 1979 Agreement, Glausers produced absolutely no evidence that Glausers ever 
mentioned this "disappointment" to Smedley or demanded strict payment of any of the 
unpaid tax or vacation obligations under the 1979 Agreement (T. 42, 47-49, 105). 
12. Smedley reasonably believed that by Glausers' acceptance of the Additional 
Lots and Project Improvements as substitute performance for the tax on vacation 
obligations, he had received frill compensation for the Additional Lots and the Project 
Improvements. Smedley held that belief until Appellees made their unexpected demands 
for payment following the deaths of the Glausers (T. 162, 166). 
13. Smedley did not unreasonably delay in the assertion of his claims of frill 
payment and satisfaction of his obligations because he was unaware of any unpaid 
obligations until he received Appellees' initial demand for payment (T. 167-170). 
279837.1 
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14. Glausers and their successors, Appellees, unreasonably delayed in their 
demand for strict performance of Smedley's payment obligations under the 1979 
Agreement by accepting the substitute performance and making no demand or claim of 
default until after the death of the Glausers and the alleged destruction of Glausers' 
business documents (T. 166-168). 
15. The trial court prevented Smedley from introducing any evidence at trial of 
the true financing nature of the 1979 transaction (R. 226, 263-275, T. 235-236). 
16. Smedley's trial evidence introduced concerning the existence and values of 
the substitute performance in the form of Additional Lots and the Project Improvements 
was uncontradicted, yet deemed inadmissible and ignored by the trial court (R. 436-438). 
17. Notwithstanding the trial court's correct finding that the Salmon Property 
was held by Glausers merely as collateral securing Smedley's obligations, the fact that 
Glausers materially damaged the Salmon Property through an uncompensated conveyance 
of a substantial portion thereof to third-party Billy Isley, was also ignored by the trial 
court (R. 425,^| 38-41). 
18. Smedley timely objected to the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law concerning the Court's refusal to admit or consider the offered 
evidence concerning the Additional Lots, the Project Improvements and the unauthorized 
and uncompensated conveyance of a portion of the Salmon Property (R. 312-324). 
279837.1 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously ruled prior to the commencement of the bench trial 
herein, that Smedley would be unable to introduce any evidence which would vary, alter 
or supplement the terms of the warranty deed and the written Agreement concerning the 
conveyance of the Davis County Property by Smedley to Glausers. That ruling was again 
reaffirmed during trial when Smedley attempted to introduce testimony concerning the 
security nature of the Davis County Property conveyance. The trial court failed to follow 
the well-settled law of this State which requires that a trial court consider parol evidence 
even without a showing of mistake, fraud or ambiguity in the conveying document. 
Winegar v. Froerer, 813 P.2d 104,110 (Utah 1991) As a recognized exception to the parol 
evidence rule, the trial court should have admitted otherwise admissible parol evidence to 
show the intentions of the party. An analysis of all the available evidence (including that 
erroneously refused by the court) would have clearly demonstrated that it was the intent 
of both parties that the conveyance by warranty deed of the Davis County Property was 
accompanied with an oral understanding that Glausers would hold the deed only as 
security and reconvey it to Smedley once Smedley's payment obligations were satisfied. 
The trial court also erroneously failed to admit or consider the unrebutted 
testimony presented on behalf of Smedley to show that substitute payments were 
provided and accepted by Glausers, fully satisfying previous payment defaults of 
279837.1 
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Smedley in his property tax and vacation funding obligations. There was no 
contradictory evidence offered to the absolute nature of the conveyances of three separate 
unimproved lots to Glausers. Neither was there any disagreement concerning the fact that 
Smedley provided to Glausers work and materials valued in excess of $94,000 without 
reimbursement. Testimony was offered even from the Plaintiffs' themselves to the fact 
that at least a portion of the substitute payments were intended to have been used to 
satisfy prior tax payment defaults. The trial court's reliance on Rules 403 and 601 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence do not support the court's findings. The offered direct, non-
hearsay evidence should have been admitted and thereafter considered and weighed by 
the court. By the precise language of the court's Findings and Conclusions, the trial court 
documented its failure to consider admissible evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to allow 
Smedley to submit both testimony and document evidence to show the 
intentions of Smedley and Glausers concerning the Davis County 
Property Conveyance 
Appellees and the trial court have failed to grasp the substantive law of this State, 
as consistently pronounced by the appellate courts, that a warranty deed instrument will 
be treated as a mortgage if it is shown that it was so intended. With Kjar v. Brimley, 497 
P.2d 23, 25 (Utah 1972), the Utah State Supreme Court first adopted the reasoning of 
7 
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surrounding jurisdictions2, in recognizing that a transaction structured as an outright 
conveyance may be in fact be a "disguised" financing arrangement. 
The law may imply a promise to repay a debt under particular 
circumstances of any case, where it is clear that the lender had 
relied on the property for his security, being satisfied that he is 
protected by its high value in relation to the amount loaned. If 
there be a large margin between the debt or sum advanced and the 
value of the land conveyed, this represents an assurance of 
payment stronger than any promise or bond of a necessitous 
borrower or debtor. 
* * * 
In equity, a deed, absolute on its face, may be shown by parol 
evidence to have been given for security purposes only; and if 
such showing be made, equity will give effect to the intention of 
the parties. 
Id. at 25, 26. 
The Kjar reasoning, as thereafter expanded and developed by the Utah appellate 
courts, provides the basis for Smedley's claims in defense to Glausers' Complaint 
regarding both the Davis County Property and the Salmon Property. The initial intended
 { 
transaction between Smedley and Mel Glauser was neither a land swap nor a reciprocal 
real estate purchase. The clear singular objective of the parties in the 1979 transaction 
was Smedley's purchase of the Melanie Acres property from Glauser in a carefully 
constructed way so as to not only secure repayment of the purchase obligation owing by 
2Kline v. Robinson, 428 P.2d 190, 194 (Nev. 1967); Cowles v. Zlaket, 334 P.2d 55, 60 
(Cal. App. 1959); Rizo v. McBeth, 398 P.2d 209, 212 (Alaska 1965). 
279837.1 
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Smedley, but to also secure said obligation and to provide a long-term cash stream for the 
remainder of the Glausers' joint lives. (T. 136-139). 
A court will properly exercise its equitable powers to treat a deed as a mortgage if 
it is shown that it was so intended. Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 
1976). "Whether a transaction is a sale, or a loan disguised as a sale, is a question 
controlled by the intention of the parties as it existed at the time of the execution and 
delivery of the instruments." Baker v. Taggart, 628 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Utah 1981). 
In both Jacobsen and Baker, the district courts took evidence and heard testimony 
at trial from the respective parties in their attempts to show, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the real intentions of the parties were to structure the conveyances of real 
property from a debtor to a creditor for security purposes, rather than as outright 
conveyances. In both cases the subject deeds conveyed to the lender were in the form of 
"absolute conveyances," without any language in the subject instruments referring to a 
security convention or right of reversion. In both cases, there was appropriate judicial 
recognition that "a deed regular in form is presumed to convey the entire fee simple title." 
Jacobsen, 557 P.2d at 158. However, in both cases, the trial courts correctly received 
parol evidence offered to show the actual intent of the parties in light of the equitable 
claims asserted. Eventually, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decisions in both 
cases to refuse the constructive mortgage assertion, due to failure of the claimants to carry 
the extremely high burden of proof required of the party seeking the equitable 
279837.1 
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construction. It is important to note, however, that not withstanding the apparently 
unambiguous language of the conveying instrument, both trial courts and the reviewing 
Supreme Court approved of the admission of the claimants' parol evidence in its effort to 
convincingly prove that the intentions of the parties differed from the language of the 
instruments. 
More recently in Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that an absolute deed with nothing more than an "oral 
understanding" may be intended by parties to constitute a financing security instrument. 
It is possible for a party to transfer a warranty deed without 
intending to convey the property. Debtors, for example, 
frequently execute absolute deeds of conveyance to creditors with 
merely an oral understanding that the creditor will hold the deed 
as security and reconvey it to the debtor once the obligation is 
satisfied. S. Nelson & D. Witman, Real Estate Finance Law 44 
(2d ed. 1985). These transactions occur to avoid the strict 
requirements of the law of mortgages. Id. The case law in this 
country "overwhelmingly establishes" that parol evidence is 
admissible in equity to show that a deed, although absolute on , 
its face, was intended as a mortgage. Id. at 46. This rule 
applies even though it was knowingly cast in the form of an 
absolute conveyance, and was not effected by fraud, mistake, 
ignorance, duress, or undue influence. Id. 
813 P.2d at 110 (emphasis added). The Winegar Court clearly disagrees with Appellees' 
contention that as a prerequisite to the admission of any parol evidence, there must first 
be a showing of ambiguity, mistake, or fraud. Unlike the general contract construction 
279837.1 
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cases cited in Appellees' Brief, the admissibility of parol evidence for the limited purpose 
of showing the actual intentions of the parties to a real estate conveyance is absolute. 
Smedley was denied his right to introduce parol evidence at trial to support his 
claim. In the Smedley's Witness List, filed with the Court prior to trial (R. 212-215), 
Smedley named three witnesses that would testify to the temporary and security nature of 
Glausers' ownership of the Davis County Property: Smedley; his son, Terry Smedley (a 
certified appraiser); and Smedley's former banker, Dennis Brown. The witness list 
prompted Appellees' filing of a Motion in Limine on January 12, 1999, seeking the trial 
court's order prohibiting any trial evidence contradicting the 1979 warranty deed which 
conveyed the Davis County Property to Glausers (R. 263-275). Due to the proximity of 
the trial, the Court scheduled a hearing on the Motion within seven days after its filing, 
without the normal briefing opportunity. On January 19, 1999, the Court heard argument, 
and took the matter under advisement. (R. 226). A ruling was communicated by 
telephone to the parties on January 22, 1999, just six days before trial, and was never 
reduced to a written order3. The oral ruling prohibited Smedley from introducing any 
evidence to the effect that the 1979 deed to the Davis County Property was intended as 
3
 Although no written order was ever prepared or issued by the Court, the parties and 
the Court referred to the ruling several times during the trial: ktBut I'm not going to recede 
from my earlier ruling that the parol evidence rule is going to bar testimony that would 
tend to go against that document itself as to the agreement that's contained within that 
document." (T. 236). 
279837.1 
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anything other than an absolute conveyance. The pre-trial ruling was tantamount to an 
order of summary judgment on the most material and valuable issue in the case. 
Because of and respecting the Court's ruling, Smedley came to trial without final 
trial preparation on the Davis County Property issue. Smedley's banker, Mr. Brown, was 
not prepared nor present to give testimony. Neither Smedley nor his son, Terry Smedley, 
were prepared to offer testimony on the issue of the intentions of the parties surrounding 
the 1979 conveyance, the 1979 value of the Davis County Property, and the parol 
evidence demonstrating the true financing character of the transaction. Correspondence 
and other collateral supporting documents concerning the relative values of the Melanie 
Acres Property and the Davis County Property were neither gathered nor produced as 
evidence. The Court's oral ruling preventing any parol evidence on the issue was clearly 
in violation of the pronouncement in Winegar: "[P]arol evidence is admissible in equity 
to show that a deed, although absolute on its face, was intended as a mortgage. This rule 
applies even though it was knowingly cast in the form of an absolute conveyance, and 
was not effected by fraud, mistake, ignorance, duress, or undue influence." 813 P.2d at 
.110. < 
In their Brief, Appellees attempt to minimize the harm caused to Smedley because 
of the Court's pre-trial error. They argue: "At trial, however, the Trial Court allowed 
i 
Smedley and his son to testify as to their understanding of the storage shed transaction. 
After hearing the Smedley's parol testimony of contrary intent, the Court upheld its 
279837.1 
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earlier decision to exclude the parol evidence." (Appellees' Brief at 16.) Later, Appellees 
assert that based upon the brief and incomplete testimony that the Court temporarily 
allowed from Smedley and Terry Smedley, that the Court "did, in fact, hear Smedley's 
parol evidence attempting to contradict the 1979 Agreement and Warranty Deed." 
(Appellees'Brief at 29-30) 
Appellees fail in their attempt to minimize the harm caused by the Court's pre-trial 
ruling. Mr. Brown, an unbiased, third-party witness, without the "self-serving" 
motivation (about which Appellees continually complain) was unavailable. The limited 
testimony of Smedley was received only "temporarily" by the trial court. When the issue 
was first raised during the testimony of Terry Smedley, the following record was made: 
A. [Terry Smedley] So when I read the contract, there was no 
word about reversion. So I said, Dad thinks they are coming 
back to him. This contract does not say that it's coming back 
to him. So therefore, there is inconsistency. That's how we 
got talking about these storage sheds. 
Q. [Mr. Davis, Smedley's attorney] When you told him that, 
what did Mel say? 
Mr. Taylor [Appellees' Attorney]: I'm going to object again 
on foundation and hearsay and also the parol evidence matter 
that we've already been through. 
The Court: Counsel, Mr. Davis, I've already made my ruling 
regarding the parol evidence and I realize I let some in at least 
temporarily before because you felt Mr. Taylor had opened 
the door. But I'm not going to recede from my earlier ruling 
that the parol evidence rule is going to bar testimony that 
would tend to go against that document itself as to the 
13 
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agreement that's contained within that document. So Tin 
going to sustain the earlier objection and sustain the objection 
to this witness as well. So let's stay away from that. 
(T. 235-236). Additionally, because of the pre-trial nature of the court's ruling, 
documentary evidence and expert testimony concerning the relative values of the Davis 
County Property and the Melanie Acres Property was neither completed nor presented. 
By way of Appellees' opening the issue briefly at trial, then complaining when Smedley 
attempted to take advantage of it, Appellees' appeal argument that Smedley has already 
enjoyed his "day in court" is without substance. Had Smedley been allowed to prepare 
and present credible evidence supporting his claim of constructive mortgage, each of the 
elements set forth in Point I of the Argument and Addendum "2" in Appellant's Brief, 
supporting the equitable construction of the warranty deed as a mortgage, could have 
been presented with clear and convincing proof. 
The Court's ruling prohibiting Smedley from offering such evidence was an error 
in the application of Utah law, and one that irreparably impaired Smedley's ability to 
present the necessary evidence to meet the high burden required of this claim. Smedley 
believes that but for the trial court's refusal to allow the parol evidence, the outcome of 
the trial as to the issue of the character of the Davis County Property would have been 
different. This Court must reverse the Judgment of the trial court and allow Smedley to 
present his case. Cal Wadsworth Construction v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 
(Utah 1995). 
279837.1 
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POINT II 
The trial court committed reversible error in deeming 
inadmissible and not considering the evidence presented 
by Smedley showing the existence and value of alternative 
performance consideration delivered by Smedley and 
accepted by Glausers 
The trial court committed reversible error when it deemed inadmissible all 
evidence presented by Smedley to show (1) the existence of the substitute payment 
performances delivered by Smedley to Glausers (2) the value of said performance, and (3) 
the consent by Glausers to said performance as satisfaction of Smedley's obligations 
under the 1995 agreement. The trial court based its erroneous ruling on Rules 403 and 
601 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the equitable doctrine of laches. 
Rule 403 states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its prohibitive 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Inasmuch as this was a trial to the bench, there was no possibility that the dangers 
addressed in this Rule would outweigh the trial court's ability to consider and weigh the 
evidence. The Utah State Supreme Court has declared that this Rule not be used to allow 
a trial court to exclude testimony simply because the court does not find it credible. In 
State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1987), the Court stated: 
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Rule 403 is not to be used to allow the trial judge to substitute 
his assessment of the credibility of testimony for that of the 
jury by excluding testimony simply because he does not find it 
credible. 
From the express findings of the trial court (R. 412, ff 48, 150) it is clear that the court 
did not even consider the substance of the presented testimony of Smedley. Rather, the 
court simply deemed all testimony supporting Smedley's substitute performance 
"inadmissible". That erroneous blanket determination of inadmissibility set forth in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law conclusively documents the Court's refusal to 
consider the non-hearsay, direct evidence, supporting Smedley's claims. By its own 
language, the court refused to even admit the admissible evidence: 
Rule 601 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
a. General Rule of Competency. Every person that is 
competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in 
these rules. 
c. Statement of Deceased Declarant offered in an action 
against Declarant's estate. 
-1 (2) Evidence of a Statement [of a deceased declarant] 
is inadmissible under this section if the statement was made 
a:i under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of 
trustworthiness. 
The direct testimony of Smedley, Terry Smedley, and various Glauser heirs as specifically 
identified in Point II of the Argument section in the Brief of Appellant demonstrates, 
without resort to any statement of either deceased declarant [Glausers], that Smedley 
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indeed conveyed the Additional Lots (T. 25-26, 55, 163-165, Exhibits 19, 34) and 
performed the Project Improvements (T. 42-43, 60-62, 156-158, Exhibits 36, 37) 
consistent with the uncontradicted evidence. The value of Smedley's substitute 
performance through the Additional Lots and the Project Improvements was established 
with competent direct non-hearsay evidence outside of any statement made by either 
deceased declarant [Glausers] (T. 11, 164, 166, 159-162). The acceptance of that 
substitute performance was the subject of direct testimony by Smedley and uncontradicted 
by Appellees despite the acknowledged ability of Glausers and their heirs to have 
produced documents, notes and records allegedly kept by Glausers detailing the history of 
business dealings between Smedley and the Glausers. Absolutely no evidence of any 
demand, complaint or loss initiated by Glausers against Smedley prior to the death of 
Glausers was ever produced contradicting Smedley's direct testimony that the substitute 
performance was accepted in full satisfaction of his admitted delinquencies in vacation 
and tax payments. 
The final basis for the court's refusal to accept and consider Smedley's testimony 
concerning the substitute performance is the equitable doctrine of laches. 
Laches is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage 
to another. To constitute laches, two elements must be 
established: (1) the lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; 
(2) An injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence. 
Although lapse of time is an essential part of laches, the 
length of time must depend on the circumstances of each case, 
for the propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated 
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upon the gravity of the prejudice suffered by defendant and 
the length of plaintiff s delay. 
Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 
1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). In Openshaw v. Openshaw, 144 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1943), the 
Utah State Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of delay as an element of laches. 
However, that court also recognized that "of equal importance are the circumstances 
occurring during the delay, the relation of the parties to the subject, disadvantages that 
may have come through loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities or injury 
from other causes". 
Appellees expend significant effort in their Brief describing the disadvantage to 
which they have been placed because of the supposed tardiness of Smedley's assertion of 
his substitute performance claims. Although Smedley acknowledges that Glausers are no 
longer available to personally testify concerning Smedley's substitute performance, 
Smedley did nothing to prevent Appellees from introducing the documentary evidence 
which they concede had been kept by Glausers throughout their relationship with 
Smedley. (T. 42, 47-48). Conveniently the documents kept by Mel Glauser concerning 
his dealings with Smedley were intentionally destroyed by Glausers or Appellees just 
prior to Glausers' deaths. (T. 48) Apparently, the assertions now made by Appellee were 
either forgotten or non-existent just prior to Glausers' deaths. 
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Recognizing, but not yet officially adopting the spoliation doctrine, this Court has 
observed that "'where a party to an action fails to provide or destroys evidence favorable 
to the opposing party, the court will infer the evidence's adverse content." Burns v. 
Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah App. 1994). The purpose of the 
spoliation doctrine is to discourage one party from wrongfully denying the other the 
evidence necessary to establish facts in dispute. Id. 
Inasmuch as Appellees are attempting to utilize principals of equity to restrict 
otherwise competent evidence, they are also subject to the same principles and maxims of 
equity which they attempt to enforce upon Smedley. "It is generally accepted that who 
seeks equity must do equity." Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984); u[0]ne 
seeking equity must take care to discharge his own obligations regardless of mere 
inconvenience." Realty Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918, 920 
(Utah 1982). "A court in equity will generally not assist one in extricating himself from 
circumstances which he has created." Battiston v. American Land and Development Co., 
607 P.2d 837, 839 (Utah 1980). 
Smedley testified that he had no knowledge of any outstanding obligation owing to 
Glausers at the time of their deaths. (T. 162, 166) Appellees presented no written 
document of any kind which had been delivered or presented to Smedley by Glausers 
notifying him of unfulfilled expectations. Only after Glausers' deaths was Smedley 
presented with demands, claims and a lawsuit to defend. Not surprisingly, prior to the 
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time he was forced to defend stale claims, Smedley has never asserted by way of defense 
to said claims his equally stale claims for full substitute performance. 
Having delayed their assertion of claims of default, some of which predated 
Glausers' death by almost ten years, Appellees should not be heard to object to the direct 
testimony of Smedley concerning the satisfaction of those claims, even if that testimony 
includes evidence of incidents that pre-dated Glausers' deaths. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, Smedley requests that this Court set aside the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by Judge Allphin, reverse the Judgment 
entered herein, and remand the matter for a new trial with instructions (1) that the District 
Court allow Smedley to introduce relevant and credible evidence as to the true character 
of the Davis County Property conveyance as supplemental to the written Agreement, (2) 
that the District Court recognize and give Smedley credit for the Project Improvements 
and Additional Lots conveyed to Glausers in full and substitute satisfaction of Smedley's 
payment obligations under the Agreement, and (3) that the District Court refuse any i 
i 
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attempt to introduce reputational evidence of Smedley which is not specifically required 
to prove an element of Appellees' claims. 
DATED this ^ day of March, 2000. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
T. Richard Davis 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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